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Casenote
First Rock to the West, Straight
on 'Til Morning: WestRock Draws
Potential Roadmap to Substantive
Challenges of ERISA
Rehabilitation Plans Under
Section 1132*
I. INTRODUCTION

Since its enactment, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA)1 has confused and frustrated practitioners, businesspeople, and
citizens alike. 2 This convoluted statute encompassing over 1,000 pageS 3
has become increasingly more difficult through several amendments as
new Congresses continue to patch the statute and "kick the can" of
retirement benefits to later sessions. 4
In WestRock RKT Co. v. Pace Industry Union Management Fund,5
WestRock RKT Company (WestRock), a contributing employer, brought
*To Dean Titshaw I owe my sincerest gratitude for his expertise, his time in reading
and editing, and his kind words of encouragement. Also, while words cannot express what
I owe to them, I can only hope this humble thank you to my wife, parents, grandparents,
and the rest of the village without whom I would not have made it this far, will suffice.
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(1974).
2. Douglas L. Lineberry, The Pension Protection Act of 2006, 19 S.C. LAW. 16, 16
(2007).
3. Id.
4. See infra Part III (discussing amendments to the ERISA statute, their justifying
purposes, and political impact).
5. 856 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2017).
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an action against Pace Industry Union Management Fund (The Fund)
arguing a violation under ERISA, which sets minimum standards for
pension plans in private industries.6 WestRock pursued this action under
a newer amendment of ERISA that, while not yet litigated, may allow
employers to challenge the substance of certain management decisions of
a fund's sponsors or directors. While the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit ultimately dismissed the case on procedural
grounds, its opinion may provide a roadmap for future employers to
challenge the actions of their common pension funds on substantive
grounds, specifically, to challenge the "reasonableness" of measures
adopted by the fund.7
This avenue would contribute to an already growing field of ERISA
litigation. 8 Given the trillions of dollars at stake,9 a long history filled
with scandal,10 and the third-rail political connotation associated with
retirement benefits," this robust source of litigation could have drastic
implications on the management and oversight of one of our nation's most
controversial institutions. 12
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Fund is a multiemployer pension plan13 to which WestRock had
been a longtime contributor. The Fund was in dire financial condition,

6. Health Plans and Benefits: ERISA, U.S DEP'T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/
general/topic/health-plans/erisa (last visited Oct. 27, 2017).
7. See WestRock, 856 F.3d at 1320.
8. See infra Part V.
9. In June 2015, retirement assets accounted for 36% of the country's household
financial assets. Government-sponsored defined-benefit plans, the focus of this Article,
constituted $5.1 trillion of the $24.9 trillion of total U.S. retirement benefits. On the other
hand, defined-contribution plans accounted for $6.8 trillion, with 401(k) plans making up

$4.7 trillion. Nick Thornton,

Total Retirement Assets Near $25 Trillion Mark,

THINKADvISOR, https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2015/06/30/total-retirement-assets-near-25
-trillion-mark/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2018).
10. See infra note 48.
11. The reason retirement benefits have become known as the "third rail" in political
circles is a practical one. Older Americans, in general, vote more often than younger
Americans. Accordingly, any politician's attempt to reform the benefit "creates a nasty
backlash" from one of America's largest sectors, the "baby-boomers." The Third Rail, THE
ECONOlynsT, http://www.economist.com/node/3258130 (last visited Mar. 22, 2018).

12. See infra Part V.
13. A multi-employer plan is a pension plan to which more than one employer
contributes, is maintained pursuant to collective-bargaining agreements, and satisfies
other requirements. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(37) (2018).
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and under the ERISA statute, was in "critical status." 14 Therefore,
ERISA required that its sponsors and directors adopt a "rehabilitation
plan" to improve its financial well-being. 15 To achieve financial stability,
these rehabilitation plans often, among other things, require a fund to
reduce expenditures, reduce future benefit accruals, and increase
employer contribution rates. 16 In this case, The Fund's sponsors adopted
a rehabilitation plan in 2010, and a subsequent amendment in 2012,
requiring WestRock and any other contributing employers seeking to
withdraw from it to pay a share of the fund's "accumulated funding
deficiency" in order to do so.1 7

WestRock challenged this amendment in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia "based on both the invalid
substance of the Amendment and the faulty procedure through which the
Amendment"18 sought to require additional contribution requirements
from WestRock and other employers.19 Relying on a newly amended
cause of action, 20 WestRock argued the rehabilitation plan was invalid
because it violated ERISA's collective-bargaining requirement and levied
an automatic payment prohibited under ERISA. However, the district
court instead agreed with the Fund's contention that the amendment was
valid and WestRock could not challenge its actions in this instance. 21
In a case of first impression, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court's dismissal of
WestRock's complaint. 22 Since WestRock failed to sufficiently allege the
Fund's amendment violated ERISA in any manner, the Eleventh Circuit
based its decision on procedural grounds and did not need to resolve the
issue of whether ERISA authorized WestRock's challenge of the
substance of the rehabilitation plan's amendment. However, in the
process, the Eleventh Circuit's opinion may have provided a roadmap for

14. A fund is in critical status if it is less than 65% funded. See 29 U.S.C.

§ 1085(b)(2)(A)(i) (2018).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 1085(a)(2)(A) (2018).
16. See 29 U.S.C. § 1085(e)(3)(A)(i) (2018).
17. WestRock,
funding deficiency
standard account'
1320, 1322 n.2.
18. WestRock,
19. Id.

856 F.3d at 1322. "Under 29 U.S.C. § 1084(a), a fund's accumulated
is the amount by which the accumulated charges to the plan's 'funding
exceed the accumulated credits to that account." WestRock, 856 F.3d
856 F.3d at 1324.

20. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2018).
21. See WestRock, 856 F.3d at 1322.
22. Id. at 1323, 1326.
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future substantive challenges to be brought under the ERISA statute in
this way. 23
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

To properly examine the facts and implications of this case, it is
necessary to begin with an overview of the history and statutory
framework of relevant sections of the ERISA statute.
A. ERISA
Originally enacted in 1974, ERISA was Congress's answer to the largescale failure of defined-benefit planS 2 4 that had become popular with the
rise of labor unions after World War II. During the post-war boom, "old
world industries" such as automobile, steel, textile, and coal, made up the
lion's share of the corporate landscape, and most of these industries
sponsored defined-benefit plans as mandated by their collectivebargaining agreements (CBA). 25 However, by the 1970s, these old world
industries had fallen on hard times, leaving their employees to question
the stability of their financial future, 26 particularly the soundness of their
27
pension plans, sparking public outcry for pension reform. In enacting
ERISA, Congress guaranteed that "if a worker has been promised a
defined pension benefit upon retirement-and if he has fulfilled whatever

23. See infra Part V.
24. A defined-benefit plan is a pension program that guarantees a specific monthly
payment at retirement. These are funded by the employer, usually as part of a CBA, and
calculate benefits using a formula that takes into account age, salary, and number of years
an employee worked at the company. This results in a plan where for example, an employee
would be entitled to 1% of average salary times total years of service, such as $100 a month.
On the other hand, a defined-contribution plan does not guarantee a specific benefit amount
upon retirement. Instead, both the employer and the employee contribute to the employee's
individual account which the employee is responsible for choosing how it is invested. Upon
retirement, the employee receives the value of the account. Retirement Plans and ERISA
FAQs, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsalabout-ebsalour-activities/
resource-center/faqs/retirement-plans-and-erisa-consumer (last visited Mar. 22, 2018).
25. Janice Kay McClendon, The Death Knell of Traditional Defined Benefit Plans:
Avoiding a Race to the 401(k) Bottom, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 809, 819 (2007).
26. Id. at 820.
27. Famously, when Studebaker, a large automobile manufacturer, closed its plant in
1963, its pension plan was so poorly funded, that of their more than 10,000 employees, only
3,600 were given their full benefits. Of the rest, 4,000 received a lump sum estimated to be
valued at only 15% of their value, and the rest received nothing for their years of service.
The U.S. Department of Labor at 40 Timeline, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/
featured/erisa40/timeline (last visited Mar. 22, 2018).
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conditions are required to obtain a vested benefit-he will actually
receive it."28
As enacted, this "comprehensive and reticulated" statute aimed to
ensure employees and other beneficiaries were not deprived of their
retirement benefits by a premature dissolution of their pension plans. 29
To achieve this goal of protecting anticipated retirement benefits, ERISA
proscribed standards for the funding, management, and benefit
provisions of these plans. Also, ERISA established the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).30 The PBGC is a wholly owned
government corporation organized within the Department of Labor and
designed to administer an insurance system for these employersponsored defined-benefit plans. Contributing employers were required
to pay premiums to the PBGC which, in turn, guaranteed benefit
payments to employees and beneficiaries in the event a pension fund
failed. 31
Within its broad scope, one class of pension plan created by ERISA is
the multiemployer pension plan, which allows several employers to
contribute to a common fund that, in turn, provides benefits to covered
retirees. 32 These plans proved advantageous for employers and
employees alike: employees could change jobs without losing pension
coverage, and employers could share the cost and risk of the plan with
one another.33 However, multiemployer pension plans presented a
problem in the original ERISA statute. If an employer withdrew from the
plan, it significantly threatened the financial stability of the fund. 34
[A] key problem of ongoing multiemployer plans, especially in
declining industries, is the problem of employer withdrawal. Employer
withdrawals reduce a plan's contribution base. This pushes the
contribution rate for remaining employers to higher and higher levels
in order to fund past service liabilities, including liabilities generated
by employers no longer participating in the plan, so-called inherited
liabilities. The rising costs may encourage-or force-further
withdrawals, thereby increasing the inherited liabilities to be funded
by an ever-decreasing contribution base. This vicious downward spiral

28. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 720 (1984).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. V7ho We Are, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP., https://www.pbgc.gov/about/
who-we-are (last visited Mar. 22, 2018).
32. See 29 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(3).
33. Concrete Pipe & Prod. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust Fund for S.
Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 606-07 (1993).
34. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 215 (1986).
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may continue until it is no longer reasonable or possible for the pension
plan to continue.35
To say that ERISA did not adequately address this issue would be an
understatement. In fact, certain provisions actually had the effect of
encouraging employer withdrawal since the employers could often do so
without compensating the plans for their inherited liabilities. 36 The
original withdrawal rules designed to protect the PBGC did not protect
multiemployer pension funds or their contributing employers from the
burden of withdrawal.3 7 Congress became concerned that the potential of
"cascading withdrawals" threatened to "impose too heavy a burden on the
PBGC" and would "collapse . . . the plan termination insurance
program."3 8 Fearing this potential collapse, Congress delayed the
multiemployer plan's mandatory insurance coverage under the PBGC
until July 1, 1979, to avoid heavy withdrawals. 39 Then, in 1980, Congress
responded to the issue by enacting the Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act (MPPAA).40
B. The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act
To alleviate the issue of employer withdrawal, the MPPAA enacted
new rules which required employers to pay a "fixed and certain debt to
the pension plan" in the event of their withdrawal. 4 1 The PBGC's
suggestions, which were principally adopted in the final statute, aimed
to ensure that an "employer withdrawing from a multiemployer plan
would be required to complete funding its fair share of the plan's
unfunded liabilities," as such "withdrawal liability" would discourage
withdrawal and "cushion the financial impact" on the plan.42 Under the
final amendment, a withdrawing employer incurred a withdrawal
liability equal to their proportional share of the multiemployer plan's
unfunded vested benefits, which was to be "calculated as the difference
between the present value of the vested benefits and the current value of

35. Id. at 216 (quoting Pension Plan TerminationInsurance Issues: HearingsBefore the
Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 22 (1978) (statement of Matthew M. Lind)).
36. Tr. of Local 138 Pension Trust v. F.W. Honerkamp Co., 692 F.3d 127, 129 (2d Cir.
2012).
37. Gray, 467 U.S. at 722.
38. Honerkamp, 692 F.3d at 129.
39. Gray, 467 U.S. at 722; see Pub. L. No. 95-214, 91 Stat. 1501.
40.

Gray, 467 U.S at 724-25; see Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208.

41. Gray, 467 U.S. at 725.
42. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 217.
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the plan's assets." 43 Essentially, the withdrawing employer would be
required to compensate the fund to continue payment of the employer's
own retired employees' benefit packages. Unfortunately, the value of a
fund's assets and benefits are influenced by several factors largely out of
the control of the fund,44 and this patch on ERISA did not stand the test
of time. 45
By 2005, many outside economic circumstances, 46 along with the
actual or imminent dissolution of several large pension plans, again
threatened ERISA and the PBGC's system of federally insured pension
plans. 47 Corporate bankruptcies and scandals like those of Enron and
WorldCom, 48 coupled with numerous documented cases of definedbenefit plan underfunding, positioned the PBGC's financial viability at
the forefront of both public and congressional concern. 49 In fact, by the
end of 2005, the PBGC estimated their own total terminated plans deficit
to be $23 billion; this included the highly publicized United Airlines and

43. Gray, 467 U.S. at 725.
44. The value of a fund's benefits is largely in control of the fund. The plan trustees set
benefit labels according to a rate negotiated in collective bargaining. On the other hand,
the value of the fund's assets may fluctuate with the market and other outside influences,
since trustees of the fund typically invest these assets. Carolyn Diane Gentile, The Effect

of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act's Withdrawal Liability Rules on
Collective BargainingRelationships and Pension Administration, 1 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 251, 253 (1983).
45. See McClendon, supranote 25.
46. For a discussion of the many economic factors leading up to the 2005 pension crisis,
see McClendon, supra note 25.
47. Id. at 809-12.
48. The Enron and WorldCom scandals raise a parallel concern driving pension reform
not directly addressed by this Article. As opposed to the traditional pension style definedbenefit plans discussed herein, ERISA also distinguished another type of retirement plan:
the "defined-contribution plan," or more commonly known as an "individual account plan,"
such as a 401(k). See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(34), (35). These plans grew in popularity after the
MPPAA since they were not subject to termination liability because individual employees
were in charge of their own investments, not the trustees of a fund. 29 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1)
(2018); see Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359 (1980). However,
these individual plans left employees with no fixed benefit post-retirement, and largely in
the dark on their investments due to a prohibition of investment advice under the original
ERISA statute. Lineberry, supra note 2, at 18. To illustrate, Enron sponsored a 401(k) plan
like most large corporations, and offered a company stock investment alternative packed
with incentive. However, these employees received no independent investment advice and
consequently invested 60% of their 401(k) plan assets in Enron stock collectively. When
Enron ultimately collapsed, these employees lost more than $1 billion in company stock
holdings. Unfortunately, Enron is not the lone example. WorldCom employees lost $1.1
billion in its scandal, and employees of RiteAid and many others suffered the same fate.
McClendon, supranote 25, at 832.
49. McClendon, supra note 25, at 809-12.
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US Airways terminations which alone discharged $9.6 billion in pension
liabilities onto the PCBG. Moreover, this estimate did not account for
plans not currently administered by the PCBG,50 and thus did not reflect
the magnitude of the issue.5 1 For example, the largest defined-benefit
plan in the United States is operated by General Motors (GM) and covers
more than 600,000 workers. The PBGC estimated that GM's plan was
underfunded by $31 billion in December 2005.52 In all, the Department
of Labor estimated that active defined-benefit plans were underfunded
by more than $450 billion.53 Ultimately, Congress instituted a plan
designed to stabilize pension plans and to ensure they remained
solvent.54

C. The Pension ProtectionAct of 2006
On August 17, 2006, President Bush signed what he characterized as
"the most sweeping reform of America's pension laws in over 30 years."55
Heralded as "one of the most important pieces of legislation"56 of the year,
the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA)57 was Congress's answer to the
federally regulated pension crisis. Totaling over one thousand pages, the
primary aim of the PPA was to stabilize benefit plan funding and to
ensure they remained funded by reducing the PCBG's exposure to
liability and to incentivize defined-contribution plans,5 8 as opposed to the
traditional defined-benefit plans.59
Notably, the act raised funding requirements of defined-benefit plans
to 100%, and imposed additional funding requirements on plans
determined to be at-risk.6 0 These measures were "designed to protect and
restore multiemployer pension plans in danger of being unable to meet
their pension distribution obligations in the near future."6 1 To this end,

50. Id. at 810.
51. Id. at 811.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Lineberry, supra note 2.
55. McClendon, supra note 25, at 809 (quoting President George W. Bush's Statement
Before Signing Pension Protection Act of 2006 (Aug. 17, 2006)).
56. Id. (quoting Press Release, Senator Chuck Grassley, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm.
on Fin., Memorandum re: Signing of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (Aug. 17, 2006)).
57. Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780.
58. The PPA removed ERISA's prohibition that 401(k) plans could not advise
participants on investments. Lineberry, supra note 2, at 16.
59. McClendon, supra note 25, at 812.
60. Id.
61. Honerkamp, 692 F.3d at 130.

2018]

WESTROCK RKT CO.

1275

the PPA established two categorieS 62 of at-risk plans: "endangered," in
which the fund is less than 80% funded, and "critical," in which the fund
is less than 65% funded.6 3 Further, in the event a plan reaches critical
status, "the plan sponsor must notify the participating employers and
unions," 64 each participating employer is automatically required to
contribute an additional 5-10%65 of the amount specified under the CBA
to account for the deficiency,66 and, most importantly, the plan sponsor
is required to "adopt a rehabilitation plan to restore the [fjund's financial
health going forward."67 According to U.S.C. § 1085,68 a proper
rehabilitation plan consists of the following:
(i) actions, including options or a range of options to be proposed to the
[employers and unions], formulated, based on reasonably anticipated
experience and reasonable actuarial assumptions, to enable the plan
to cease to be in critical status by the end of the [ten year]
rehabilitation period and may include reductions in plan expenditures
(including plan mergers and consolidations), reductions in future
benefit accruals or increases in contributions, if agreed to by the
[employers and unions], or any combination of such actions, or
(ii) if the plan sponsor determines that, based on reasonable actuarial
assumptions and upon exhaustion of all reasonable measures, the plan
can not reasonably be expected to emerge from critical status by the
end of the rehabilitation period, reasonable measures to emerge from
critical status at a later time or to forestall possible insolvency. ...69
These rehabilitation plans force plan sponsors, employers, and
employees to take affirmative action to improve the financial viability of
70
the fund.

62. Section 1085 of 29 U.S.C. sets the requirements for both categories of at-risk plans.
It details how to determine if a fund is in critical or endangered status, 29 U.S.C. § 1085(b),
the process of adoption and updates of funding improvement plans for endangered funds,
29 U.S.C. § 1085(c), and adoption and updates of rehabilitation plans for critical funds, 29
U.S.C. § 1085(e).
63. Honerkamp, 692 F.3d at 130.
64. Id.
65. Normally, when a fund is facing an accumulated funding deficiency, employers face
an automatic payment to compensate for the deficiency. However, under 29 U.S.C. § 1082,
employers may be relieved from this payment when a rehabilitation plan is adopted.
WestRock, 856 F.3d at 1325.
66. Honerkamp, 692 F.3d at 131.
67. Id.
68. 29 U.S.C. § 1085 (2018).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 1085(e)(3)(a)(i)-(ii).
70. WestRock, 856 F.3d at 1323.
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By design, the PPA sets out two alternative versions of rehabilitation
plans: the first, § 1085(e)(3)(a)(i), 71 enumerates several financial options
a fund may explore to shed their critical status provided they reach an
agreement with the contributing employers or unions through collective
bargaining and contribution rate schedules are provided annually to the
bargaining parties; 72 the second version, § 1085(e)(3)(a)(ii), 73 allows for
other "reasonable measures" to be employed if the plan is not expected to
shed its critical status within the rehabilitation period. 74 However, the
latter alternative, while not requiring an agreement between the parties,
requires the plan sponsor to specify the alternatives considered, give an
explanation as to why they do not expect the plan to emerge from critical
status, and state "when, if ever, the plan is expected to emerge from
critical status."7 5
Since the PPA's enactment, these rehabilitation plans have proven to
be mutually beneficial. The funds and their sponsors are more likely to
reach financial stability, and employers, who would face an automatic
payment upon entering critical status to compensate for their fund's
deficiencies, 76 are instead relieved from this automatic payment in lieu
of the compensation schedule set out in the rehabilitation plan.7 7
Additionally, as part of the PPA, Congress's amendments to ERISA
included a new cause of action for employers "in certain scenarios related
to these special funding rules" the PPA created.78 Under the original
enactment and subsequent amendments of ERISA, contributing
employers were afforded no cause of action to challenge the actions of the
fund and its sponsors in civil suits. 79 Instead, since "Congress enacted
ERISA to protect .

.

. the interests of participants in employee benefit

plans and their beneficiaries," 80 employers' rights were extremely
limited. However, due to these new funding requirements affecting
contributing employers, Congress amended subsections in § 113281 of
ERISA to allow an employer to bring a civil action "if the plan sponsor
fails to update or comply with the terms of the funding improvement or

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

29 U.S.C. § 1085(e)(3)(a)(i).
See id.
29 U.S.C. § 1085(e)(3)(a)(ii).
See id.
Id.
WestRock, 856 F.3d at 1325.
Id.
Id. at 1323.
See Dime Coal Co. v. Combs, 796 F.2d 394 (11th Cir. 1986).
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004).
29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2018).
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of at-risk

plans.83
IV. CouRT's RATIONALE

The WestRock case came before Circuit Judge Charles Wilson, who
wrote the opinion of the court, Senior Circuit Judge Lanier Anderson,
and the Honorable Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, United States District
Judge for the District of Columbia, sitting by designation. In this case,
employer WestRock asserted a cause of action challenging The Fund's
sponsor's amendment to its rehabilitation plan. WestRock contended
that § 1132(a)(10)(B)8 authorized their action85 in that it states that "a
civil action may be brought by an employer: if the plan sponsor-(B) fails
to update or comply with the terms of the funding improvement or
rehabilitation plan in accordance with the requirements of [§ 1085]"86 In
short, it argued this amendment violated the strict guidelines for
enacting rehabilitation plans set forth in § 1085.87
WestRock placed heavy importance on the "in accordance" phrase of
§ 1132(a)(10)(B). It contended that this statute provides contributing
employers a cause of action to compel multiemployer pension plan
sponsors to follow the correct procedure in adopting rehabilitation plan
contribution requirements and a cause of action to ensure these
rehabilitation plan requirements conform to the substantive guidelines
set out in § 1085.88 Under this view, § 1132 would allow WestRock to
challenge both the substance and procedure of The Fund's amendment
under § 1085. On the other hand, The Fund interpreted subsection B
narrowly and claimed it "only permits an employer to bring an action
when the Board fails to update in accordance with the procedural
requirements of §1085-specifically the requirements that the
rehabilitation plan must be updated annually and that the update must
be filed with the plan's annual report."89 Under this view, arguments as

82. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(10)(B).
83. At-risk plans are defined supraPart M.
84. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(10)(B).
85. WestRock, 856 F.3d at 1324. WestRock had no cause of action under subsection A
of § 1132(a)(10). Subsection A applies to challenges where no pension fund rehabilitation
plan has been adopted. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(10)(A).
86. WestRock, 856 F.3d at 1323.
87. WestRock also contended that 29 U.S.C. § 1451(a) supported their cause of action
as well. This argument will not be addressed in this Article as it was ultimately struck
down by the court. See WestRock, 856 F.3d at 1323.
88. WestRock, 856 F.3d at 1324.
89. Id.
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to the substance of a rehabilitation plan are outside the scope of § 1132
and, thus, does not afford a cause of action.90
Unfortunately, the court did not need to determine whether § 1132
authorized substantive challenges, since WestRock failed to properly
allege the amendment was not in accordance with § 1085 at all, either
procedurally or substantively. 91
WestRock claimed the amendment violated § 1085 because (1)
contribution rate schedules were not provided to it and that the
amendment was not bargained for among the parties, and (2) critical
status rehabilitation plans may not unilaterally impose contribution
requirements on employers to avoid accumulated funding deficiencies. 92
Procedurally, WestRock's argument that it did not collectively bargain
for the amendment and was not provided with contribution rate
schedules was inapplicable as it implicated the first version of
rehabilitation plan under § 1085(e)(3)(a)(i), 9 3 whereas The Fund's
amendment was actually enacted under the second version of
rehabilitation plans created by § 1085(e)(3)(a)(ii). 94 Therefore, while
WestRock would be correct that collective bargaining is required to
increase contributions under the first version,95 the second version of
rehabilitation plan created by § 1085 allows The Fund to enact
"reasonable measures" to emerge from critical status without collective
bargaining.96 The court reached this conclusion relying on the
comprehensive nature of the ERISA statute to determine congressional
intent.9 7 Since the language "if agreed to by the bargaining parties,"
which appears as a requirement of the first version of rehabilitation
plan,9 8 is absent from the text of the second version,99 the court reasoned
this was done intentionally and refused to infer Congress's silence as
accidental.1 00 Essentially, if Congress had intended "reasonable

90. Id.
91.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.

Id.
29 U.S.C. § 1085(e)(3)(a)(i).
WestRock, 856 F.3d at 1324.
29 U.S.C. § 1085(e)(3)(a)(i).
29 U.S.C. § 1085(e)(3)(a)(ii).
WestRock, 856 F.3d at 1325.
29 U.S.C. § 1085(e)(3)(a)(i).
29 U.S.C. § 1085(e)(3)(a)(ii).
WestRock, 856 F.3d at 1324; see Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344 F.3d 1161, 1168

(11th Cir. 2003) ("Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute
but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.").
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measures" to be subject under the collective-bargaining requirement, it
would have said so.
Further, while § 1085(e)(3)(a)(ii) "does place [procedural] restrictions
on a plan sponsor's ability to adopt reasonable measures,"10 1 WestRock
did not attack this statute. Section 1085(e)(3)(a)(ii) states that the
rehabilitation plan's sponsors must provide annual standards, "set forth
the alternatives considered, explain why the plan is not reasonably
expected to emerge from critical status by the end of the rehabilitation
period, and specify when, if ever, the plan is expected to emerge from
critical status in accordance with the rehabilitation plan." 102 However,
WestRock failed to allege that the Fund did not meet any of these
requirements, and therefore, did not state a claim which would support
a cause of action under § 1132(a)(10)(B). 10s
Substantively, WestRock's argument that unilaterally charging
employers who wish to withdraw for their share of accumulating funding
deficiencies violates § 1085 fails on two grounds. 104 First, § 1132(a)(10)(B)
only provides a cause of action for violations of rehabilitation plans
arising under § 1085.105 However, it is Section 1082 that relieves
employers from automatic payment upon the adoption of a rehabilitation
plan.106 Moreover, even if this had arisen under § 1085, this argument
would have failed because § 1082 only exempts employers from the
automatic payments to compensate for the deficiency normally faced, and
"it does not go so far as to prohibit a charge based on accumulated funding
deficiencies in all scenarios."10 7 Essentially, while § 1082 waives an
automatic payment, it does not prevent a fund from including additional
contributions in its rehabilitation plan. 108 Again, the court based this
conclusion on the comprehensive nature of the ERISA statute. 109 Since
nothing in the text indicates Congress exempted any charges related to
accumulated funding deficiencies, its silence is controlling. 110

101. WestRock, 856 F.3d at 1325-26.
102. 29 U.S.C. § 1085(e)(3)(a)(ii).
103. WestRock, 856 F.3d at 1324.
104. Id.
105. See 29 U.S.C. § 1085(e)(3)(a)(i).
106. 29 U.S.C § 1082.
107. WestRock, 856 F.3d at 1325.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1226 (11th Cir. 2001)
("Where Congress knows how to say something but chooses not to, its silence is
controlling.").
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V. IMPLICATIONS

While the Eleventh Circuit left unanswered the question of whether §
1132 authorized a cause of action to challenge the substantive
requirements of a rehabilitation plan enacted under § 1085, it may have
provided a roadmap to do just that. It appears WestRock merely attacked
the wrong statute if § 1132(a)(10)(B) does indeed allow substantive
challenges to be brought against rehabilitation plans devised under §
1085. Therefore, the court may have considered the "reasonableness" of
measures enacted by The Fund under § 1085(e)(3)(a)(ii) had WestRock
correctly asserted this claim."'
In view of both interpretations of § 1132(a)(10)(B)'s grant, and the
court's rationale in deciding the case, it appears the court would have
considered the "reasonableness" of the rehabilitation plan adopted by
The Fund without collective bargaining under § 1085(e)(3)(a)(ii). The
court ultimately decided the case on the grounds that "where Congress
knows how to say something but chooses not to, its silence is
controlling."11 2 In applying this holding to the statute in question, § 1132,
The Fund's argument that § 1132(a)(10)(B) only permits an action when
a rehabilitation plan "fails to update in accordance with the procedural
requirements of § 1085" seems suspect. Because "procedural" does not
appear in the text,113 this court may have been inclined to find the
absence of "procedural" in § 1132(a)(10)(B)'s grant to be intentional in
light of its recognition of the "comprehensive and reticulated" nature of
the ERISA statute, and the court's acquiescence to Congress's silence
when it has "already said so much out loud."11 4 Therefore, WestRock may
have been permitted to bring a substantive challenge of the "reasonable
measures" under which the amendment was adopted had it correctly
challenged them under § 1085(e)(3)(a)(ii).115
Policy arguments support this contention as well. In line with the
theme of congressional intent, Congress may have intended to create a
substantive cause of action when it amended § 1132. Prior to the
amendment, contributing employer's rights were admittedly extremely
limited "to protect the interests of participants in employee benefit plans
and their beneficiaries."" 6 However, in creating the new special funding
rules discussed here, it was necessary to afford the employers a right of
111. See WestRock, 856 F.3d at 1320.
112. CBS, 245 F.3d at 1226 (quoting Griffith v. United States, 206 F.3d 1389, 1394 (11th
Cir. 2000)).
113. See WestRock, 856 F.3d at 1320.
114. Useden v. Acker, 947 F.2d 1563, 1582 (11th Cir. 1991).
115. See WestRock, 856 F.3d at 1320.
116. Davila, 542 U.S. at 208.
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action in certain instances, presumably to protect the interest of the
employers and employees alike.11 7
In this scenario, when a plan sponsor enacts a rehabilitation plan
pursuant to the first version of § 1085(e)(3)(a)(i), its substantive terms
are protected from abuse by the contributing employers or labor unions
themselves. The employers or unions have the statutory right to bargain
for these financial proposals, whether they be reductions in plan
expenditures, reductions in future benefits, or increases in
contributions. 118 This provides a check-and-balance system on the fund
to protect the interests of the contributing employers and beneficiaries.
However, when plan sponsors enact a rehabilitation plan pursuant to
the second version of § 1085, § 1085(e)(3)(a)(ii), the statutory protection
of collective bargaining is not afforded to the contributing employers and
their beneficiaries. Instead, it is within the plan sponsor's unilateral
authority to adopt "reasonable measures" to secure the financial stability
of the fund, free from oversight or input from the contributing
employers. 119 In fact, the only requirements these reasonable measures
carry is that the plan sponsor set forth the alternatives they may (or may
not) have considered, explain their reasoning for believing the plan will
not emerge from critical status within the rehabilitation time, and state
when, if at all, they expect the plan to emerge from critical status. 120
Given that all of these requirements would arise from procedural
challenges, if § 1132(a)(10)(B) did not provide for substantive review of a
rehabilitation plan's terms, contributing employers or unions would be
left without redress in the event of an unreasonable substantive term
enacted completely out of their authority. In essence, as long as a plan's
sponsors dot their i's and cross their t's, their governance becomes a
despotic tyranny, and contributing employers would be subject to any
amendments the sponsors may choose to adopt until the fund emerges, if
ever, from critical status. 121
Also, this would not be the only area under which a § 1132 cause of
action has been interpreted broadly to protect beneficiaries. The
jurisprudence of § 1132(a)(1)(B),1 22 which provides a cause of action for
employees to recover plan benefits, and § 1132(a)(3), 123 which provides a
cause of action for a fund sponsor's breach of fiduciary duty, has

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Pub. L. No.
29 U.S.C. §
29 U.S.C. §
Id.
Id.
29 U.S.C. §
29 U.S.C. §

109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006).
1085(e)(3)(a)(i).
1085(e)(3)(a)(ii).

1132(a)(1)(B).
1132(a)(3).
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increasingly been interpreted to allow pension plan beneficiaries to
assert both claims against the fund. A recent United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit case, Jones v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,124
is the latest in a line of cases from several circuits "regarding a plan
participant's ability to assert simultaneous actions under sections
1132(a)(1)(B) and 1132(a)(3)." 125 In short, four circuits "have held that a
plan participant can assert a claim for equitable relief while
simultaneously seeking plan benefits," a conclusion rarely reached in the
past when it was thought plan benefits provided an adequate remedy and
that an equitable remedy was not needed.126 Therefore, with increasing
willingness of the courts to interpret § 1132 broadly, those that defend
benefit claims find it likely that claims arising from breaches of fiduciary
duties will become more common.127
Further, other phases of ERISA have seen an uptick in litigation in
the last two years as well. Several recent cases have questioned the
fiduciary process of a fund via excessive fee arrangements. 128 Driving
these new allegations has been Tibble v. Edison,129 a recent Supreme
Court of the United States decision requiring plan sponsors to monitor
its investments. 130
Targets of litigation have also been broadening in scope. Aside from
the typical corporate plan sponsors, university and college plan sponsors
have been involved, and church plans have even faced lawsuits. 131 These
recent decisions will lead a new era of ERISA litigation that questions
not only fees but the administration and selection of the investments of
these funds. These developments show a willingness of the court to
restrain fund sponsors and protect the interests of contributing
employers and thereby the fund's beneficiaries.1 32
If it were indeed found that rehabilitation plans implemented or
amended under § 1085 could be challenged on substantive grounds by §
1132(a)(10), it could result in a widespread flood of litigation. As more

124. 856 F.3d 541 (8th Cir. 2017).
125. Patrick Begos, It May Be Time To Start Thinking About Equitable Claims Again,
ERISA Claim Defense Blog (May 18, 2017), https://www.erisaclaimdefense.com/may-timestart-thinking-equitable-claims/.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Rebecca Moore, Expect More Varied ERISA Litigation in 2017, PLANADVISER,
(last visited
https://www.planadviser.com/expect-more-varied-erisa-litigation-in-2017/
Mar. 23, 2018)
129. 135 S. Ct. 1823 (2015).
130. Id. at 1828.
131. Begos, supranote 125.
132. Id.
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and more of these traditional defined-benefit pension plans continue to
struggle because large corporations, and even municipalities, file for
bankruptcy, critical status plans will remain an issue. Accordingly, the
means of keeping these plans financially viable will remain hotly
contested. However, by granting contributing employers a ticket into
court as broad as "unreasonable measures" taken pursuant to §
1085(e)(3)(a)(ii), § 1132 may create a flood of ERISA litigation courts are
ill-prepared to handle. If this were indeed to become an issue, and if we
are to learn anything from the tangled history of ERISA, one likely
should not expect the issue to be resolved. Rather, one would expect
another convoluted "patch" on the ERISA statute in the near future as
yet another Congress "kicks the can" further down the line to avoid the
aptly named third rail of politics.1 33

Michael Berthiaume

133. See supra Part III.
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